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though it is in fact new in many ways) or, especially, a high level of political activism, ultimately aimed at taking power. (The latter was not important in the first wave of fundamentalism in the United States during the 1920s, which would not meet the definition given above.) Here a more limited group, seen as more similar and significantly comparable, will be discussed; and a different analysis will be made of the reasons for the rise of religiopolitics in certain areas, after first noting relevant factors that exist in much of the world.
WORLDWIDE TRENDS FAVORING RELIGIOPOLITICS
Common factors behind these movements may be found in recent world-wide trends.8 Some of these trends also exist where these movements are weak or nonexistent, something which can be explained. Such distinctions are needed to distinguish causes that are necessary but not sufficient and require other factors if a phenomenon is to occur.9 Many of the socioeconomic and political reasons often cited for the rise of these movements are in this necessary but insufficient category, as these reasons are also present in areas without such movements. Factors widely present everywhere help explain the nearly simultaneous rise and timing of contemporary fundamentalist movements, influenced by world-wide socioeconomic, political, and cultural changes, although more is needed to explain why these factors have led to movements in some areas but not in others. Global trends that have favored the recent rise of religiopolitics are often cited when discussing particular movements. There follows a list of trends that have favored religiopolitics in many areas. Some have been felt strongly almost everywhere, while others are mitigated in some areas, such as the first two for East Asia until 1998. These trends include:
First, recent expansive developments in capitalism (the main element of globalization), which have increased total production but are highly uneven by region, class, race, and gender. Income distribution gaps have grown in most areas, along with job insecurities and forced migration-all factors in discontent or concerns about identity.
Second, economic slowdowns, stagnation, and insecurity in the developed world, the Middle East, much of South Asia, Africa, and Latin America have encouraged discontent and right-wing populist movements, which tend to nationalism in some areas and to religiopolitics (often combined with nationalism) in others.
Third, increasing migration, which may improve living standards but produces certain other strains. Urbanizing and international migrants experience prejudice, which can encourage counterideologies. Some religiopolitics first center abroad, as with Sikhs in Canada. "Fundamentalist" ideologies may seem more familiar to uprooted rural-urban migrants than secular nationalism. There are also anti-immigrant religiopolitics.
Fourth, greater choice for women in lifestyle, jobs, marriage, and motherhood, while reducing patriarchal problems, has led to new stresses, such as rising divorce, inadequate child care, and disputed challenges to male prerogatives. This encourages nostalgia in some for the way things used to be. Other recent changes in family structure make young people more independent and eager to find new identities.
Fifth, the continued growth in secular state power, while bringing social gains, favors some groups but creates regulations opposed by many. Governments are blamed for socioeconomic change. With a failure-both by capitalist and socialist systems-to solve some problems, there is a tendency to turn to ideologies both new and familiar, whether right-wing nationalism or religiopolitics.
Sixth, education and urban growth allow many people to express their discontentment more effectively. This favors religiopolitics, which seem familiar, can claim a moral high ground and are independent of discredited states and parties.
Seventh, global cultural homogenization brings reactions based on identity politics, including nationalism and religiopolitics because they are seen as expressing needs better than the current secular order, which favors universalist modem western values. In some areas (such as Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia) religious and ethnic or linguistic divisions coincide, increasing divisiveness. Many also perceive a crisis in moral terms, one that requires a religious solution.
Eighth, in the Global South improvements in health have led to increases in population. Population growth has brought new strains and skewered the demographics of the population toward very young age groups, groups that are the main supporters of religiopolitical movements in this region.
No movement arises simply as a reaction to such general factors; all involve active individuals moving in ways that are unpredictable. In order to be comparative, this article must stress general factors at the expense of individual features. 10
WHY HAVE RELIGIOPOLITICS ARISEN WHERE THEY HAVE?
If we look for movements expressing New Religious Politics, we find important ones chiefly in the United States, South Asia, the Muslim World, and Israel. Among Muslims the strongest movements are in the Middle East; movements in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia till now are less salient.
Liberation Theology, strongest in Latin America, is different in not being traditionalist in ideology and in being more, not less, liberal or socialist than the official church or doctrine. Neither liberal nor socialist movements fit the NRP's stress on conservatism and homogeneous religious doctrine, so Christian Democratic parties and others who accept existing liberal or social democratic states are not included, even though the border between them and moderate fundamentalists is not rigid. Although many Roman Catholics do fit part of the above definition, only the small number who belong to movements that aim at taking power in a state in order to enforce their interpretation of doctrine qualify-and the same is true for other religions. There are other religiopolitical movements that also fit the definition in Latin America, Africa, Europe, and non-Muslim East Asia; but their scale and importance is smaller than in the areas stressed here. Some scholars, based on different definitions of fundamentalism, limit the concept to those who follow monotheist scriptural religions, so they put Hindu and Buddhist revivalists into another category.11 Given my emphasis not on monotheist scripturalism but on religious politics, conservatism, and populism, however, I include nationalist Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists. The communalism or religious nationalism found in South Asia has many parallels among monotheists in countries with a recent history of communal struggles for power or territory, including Israeli Jews, and Muslims in Southeast Asia, Palestine, and some other areas. is struck more by major differences among these areas than by similarities. Several religions are represented, as are nations with very different levels of development and histories. The United States is an economically developed superpower that has dominated other regions; Israel is developed and combines a history of persecution with that of dominance; South Asia and most of the Muslim world are much poorer, less developed, and have a history as colonies or semi-colonies. While these differences are reflected in these regions' religiopolitics, with the third world's being anti-Western and seeing Judaism and Christianity as the cultural arms of neo-colonialism, there are nonetheless major similarities in their religious politics. Is it just an accident or a trend of the times that New Religious Politics is found in these very different areas, especially since there seems to be little direct influence from one fundamentalist culture to another? Or have we not looked in the right places for comparable features?
The features leading to New Religious Politics include those listed above, such as a search for a secure identity in the face of rapid socioeconomic and cultural changes; growing income gaps; changes in the status of women, the family, and sexual mores; and the growing and often unpopular power of secular central governments and their failure to meet the economic and cultural needs of their subjects. Such factors are justly stressed in discussions of NRP movements, but many exist as much in countries without strong movements as in those that have them. These factors, thus, do not answer the question of why these movements appear where they do. Hence, despite their importance, they will not be reiterated but will be assumed as a background common to many countries with and without the emergence of significant NRP movements.
To state in advance an explanatory hypothesis: Significant NRP movements thus far tend to occur only where in recent decades (whatever the distant past) religions with supernatural and theistic content are believed in, or strongly identified with, by a large proportion of the population. In addition, either or both of the following must also be true in recent times: a high percentage of the population identifies with the basic tenets of its religious tradition regarding its god or gods, its scriptural text, and so forth. The only single word for this phenomenon is a term, normally used differently but recognizable-religiosity. Or else, or in addition, at least two strong religious communities exist; and there is a widespread quasi-nationalist identification with one's religious community as against other communities. This second variety will be called religious nationalism or "communalism," which, like "fundamentalism," is still used even by many who dislike it because it is the only appropriate way to refer to it in one word.
The factors of religiosity or communalism are often the main ones distinguishing communities with or without significant New Religious Politics; religiosity in the above sense distinguishes the United States from Western Europe, and Muslim countries from Confucian ones, for example.14 Such factors have rarely been discussed by scholars except in discussions over whether monotheistic scripturalism is necessary to fundamentalism, a question which does not explain the contrast in levels of fundamentalism between the United States, where levels of belief and church membership are high, and Western Europe, where they are low.15 For all the pitfalls in discussing levels of religious belief and identification, which vary over time and region, such levels are often recognizable enough to support generalizations in the contemporary period when New Religious Politics develop.
Both communal and fundamentalist groups have been mobilized by steps taken by secularizing governments and hegemonic elites. The measures offending many believers of these groups include the U.S. Supreme Court decisions since 1962, affirmative action programs in the United States and India, and reforms in law, education, and gender and family matters in the Muslim world and elsewhere. There has also been widespread disillusionment in many regions with secular governments that have come to power because they have been unable to meet major problems in many regions, whether the governments are socialist or capitalist in orientation.
Both rapid and often unpopular recent socioeconomic and political change and religiosity or communalism seem necessary for fundamentalism to become strong. Religiosity and communalism strongly influence whether a strong movement of New Religious Politics will develop in an area that fits an appropriate socioeconomic and political profile, but socioeconomic and political causes appear to be the most important factor in explaining when they occur. Further, major religiopolitical movements have occurred from the 1970s on only after certain socioeconomic and cultural changes typical of these recent decades have taken place in areas with a recent history of religiosity or communalism.
Latin America (and some other areas) may be a case for the future, since that region has both religiosity and many of the requisite socioeconomic and political problems. There, however, the fundamentalists are mostly Protestants who are not yet oriented toward overthrowing old power centers. To date, Roman Catholics, even in believing areas, have resisted fundamentalism, aside from 14 Socioeconomic distinctions exist but are insufficient to account for differences in religiopolitics. East Asia has developed more rapidly than the Middle East, but this was far less true when religiopolitics first expanded in the 1970s; and differences in socioeconomic egalitarianism and the social safety net between Western Europe and the United States were also less salient then. In the interwar period the Hindu-centered nationalist ideology was developed especially by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded in 1925. Its ideology centered on the concept of Hindutva, put forth in a 1922 book by that name by the RSS leader, Savarkar. The book and the RSS, followed by some later Hindu nationalists, argued that Hindus were all who lived in, and acknowledged cultural ties to, ancient India. This often included Sikhs, Jains, and untouchables, with only Muslims and Christians regarded as enemies. Some RSS publicists suggested that the best analogy to their understanding of nationhood was found in Zionism. 19 Although it lost much popularity after it was associated with Mahatma Gandhi's assassination, the RSS has since been greatly revived and has contributed to two newer Hindu nationalist organizations in the past two decades, the Vishna Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bharatiya Janba Sangh (BJP) political party. The recent growth of Hindu nationalism is in part due to disillusionment with the acts of secular governments. Most scholars consider the key initial point for the contemporary efflorescence of religiopolitical nationalism in India to be the 1975-77 emergency rule of Indira Gandhi, a time when civil liberties were curbed, opponents jailed, and Congress lost its popularity. As the RSS entered more actively into politics under new leaders in the 1970s, some of its leaders helped form the new religiopolitical groups. The RSS and some other religiopolitical groups in India do not demand particular acts of worship or beliefs so much as an overall belief in Hinduism. The RSS has also been notable for having a separate and militant women's organization since 1936 which combined traditional and modern ideas. acteristics but not always religiously fundamentalist ones. Hindu nationalists have constructed modem though politically conservative doctrines and organizations: They are intolerant of other doctrines, including both those defined as religious Others and secularism; mobilize militants around a creed that claims to be traditional but is mostly novel; and seek state power in the name of this creed. They are also highly concerned to have Hindu control of both territory and culture, while they are hostile to minorities, especially Muslims, who are seen as threatening that control. Pre-colonial Hinduism was neither monotheistic nor scriptural, and some scholars deny that it was even a single religion,22 but Hindu nationalism, building on Hindu modernism, supports a creed that has become far more like the monotheistic, scriptural religions it fights than that of the decentralized Hinduism of the past. This is partly due to the large presence in India of non-Hindu scripturalist religions, Muslim and Christian, seen as effective enemies by Hindu nationalists, and also due to the need for a unified doctrine to support a unified movement. The elements of communalism in Islamist theories, in ultra-Zionism, and in some other movements are reflected both in hostility to other communities and in a focus on communal control of territory and of centers of power and influence. The Zionist right has strong communal elements supporting its exclusive identity against another community competing for the same territory.
South Asian communalists were in a sense pioneers when they organized effective right-wing religiopolitics, having a history now of a century of organization, action, and ideology. This may be why some scholars of South Asia hesitate to place a movement that to them is both historically familiar and nonscriptural in a class with recent scriptural and noncommunal movements. Recent South Asian movements do, however, display NRP novelties-chiefly an unprecedented political organization and strength, including provincial election victories and pluralities for the BJP in the national Indian elections of 1996 and 1998-which make them part of the international resurgence of religious politics. A BJP-led government from March 1998 toned down its anti-Muslim rhetoric, in part to secure allies from other parties.
Communal religiopolitics focuses on controlling territory and suppressing other communities. In South Asia, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh nationalists concentrate on such programs of control and suppression; in Israel, religiopolitics stresses control over disputed territories and denies Arab claims; and in Palestine religiopolitics calls for Muslim Arab control of all former Palestine. The primacy of territorial and power issues sometimes means paying less attention to religion.
In some areas religious and ethnic communalism are intermixed, as in Nigeria and Malaysia, where Muslims comprise about half the population and where most non-Muslims have different ethnicities. Muslims there have had less education and less opportunity to enter modern economic sectors, and Islamist claims have helped strengthen the economic and political clout of Muslims.33
Although it has earlier roots, communalism is tied to colonialism and continues to be so in the post-colonial period. As noted previously, communalism is especially characteristic of British colonies and to the playing of communal politics by British colonizers. It was also a part of the background of the Islamist Moro revolt against U.S. colonialism in the Philippines but apparently was less important in France's colonies, possibly because of the French preference for universalism in their educational system and in some other policies.
Communalist NRP trends are less religiously cohesive than are movements with a greater background in religiosity. In Hinduism this is often attributed to the lack of a single god, scripture, and ritual; but this is also true of the very varied trends in political Judaism, where there is one scripture and one God. Like Hindu nationalists, the newer Israeli groups like Gush Emunim and Kach fo-cus on national and territorial goals; while older groups, like the traditionalist Haredim and the religious parties, stress religious strictness.34 The emphasis on nationalism and territory leads some to exclude Jewish and Hindu politics from fundamentalism. Given the definition here, both belong, however, to the New Religious Politics, even though some communal or religious nationalist movements have fewer religious requirements. These movements are especially distinguished by hostility to other religious or religio-ethnic groups and by a stress on the control of a territory by their own religious group. Hostility to their own government, based largely on that government's secularism and its supposed complaisance to the main target group, is often a secondary theme.
NON-COMMUNAL MOVEMENTS: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
There are two major non-communal or less-communal religiopolitical groupings: those in the Muslim world and those in the United States. These differ from communal movements because they place a greater stress on religion and reflect conservative positions on gender and family issues, and on replacing evil governments rather than taking or controlling territory. Religiopolitics in the United States and the Muslim world are similar in stressing religion and conservative behavior rather than territorial goals and in wanting to replace secular governments; but they differ in points of origin and in the groups to which they appeal. They both have a central emphasis on policies that affect women and the family, see contemporary mores as contrary to religion and morality, and call for a return to an idealized past with patriarchal family structures and limits on women's control of their bodies and activity in the public sphere.43
The decentralized democratic politics of the United States make it possible for the Christian Right to act through many different organizations and in many diverse ways, including supporting candidates and propaganda at all levels and pushing for a variety of national and local laws to chip away at abortion, favor Christianity in the schools, block many rights for homosexuals, and so forth. The very political nature of today's Christian Right, including direct entry into various forms of partisan and non-partisan politics, differentiates them from most of those who called themselves fundamentalist early in the twentieth century. The achievement of political goals, including the political enforcement of ideological goals, now takes priority for most of the Christian Right.
COMMONALITIES AND DIVERGENCES IN NRP MOVEMENTS
The argument thus far has three main distinctive features. First, it provides a list of socioeconomic, political, and cultural factors in religiopolitics. Second, it gives a definition of New Religious Politics, not based only on scriptural monotheism, which accounts both for primarily communal movements and for those based more on religiosity. Third, it sees religiosity and communalism, as defined, as two key factors demarcating the areas where New Religious Politics are to be found and notes differences in movements with these two bases.
Despite major differences among religiopolitical movements, it is striking In attempting to answer the question why some countries have more religiopolitics than others, we could start with why only the United States, among either countries of advanced industrialization or of Christian majorities, has a major NRP movement, even though many of the others may have constituent elements expressed in movements such as Christian Democracy, Catholic Integrism, Liberation Theology, or non-political fundamentalism. 46 The most convincing reply as to why the United States has more fundamentalism than any other Christian-majority country is that such a Christian religiopolitics seems possible only with the multidenominational situation there, and especially its far higher levels (shown in numerous polls) of belief in God, in the literal truth of the Bible, and in such things as special creation, than in any other industrialized country with a Christian majority. To cite only a few of many poll data, 72 percent of Americans have said the Bible is the Word of God, with 39 percent indicating it should be taken literally and 44 percent professing that they believe God created the world "in pretty much its present form" within the past 10,000 years.47 Of the large numbers of people attending church, many belong to evangelical denominations that believe in the inerrancy of the Bible. This latter group has provided, ever since the late-nineteenth-century rise of religious modernism and Darwinism, a large base for fundamentalism that does not exist elsewhere. In Europe, belief in God, the Bible, and basic Christian doctrines is far less widespread.48 There is today no basis in Europe in widespread religious belief for mass opposition to Darwin, abortion, birth control, or any of the other points that U.S. fundamentalists see in the Bible.
We do not have good religious poll data for developing countries, and in many of them one could not poll people about their beliefs; but there is little doubt about the strength of belief in Islam and the importance of scripture in the contemporary Muslim world. In Israel, although the founders were secularists, and secularism continues to be strong, there has been an increasing push, strengthened by the heavy immigration of more religious Oriental Jews, to have Jewish religious identification be a stronger part of Israel's identity. As in South Asia, strong communal identity centering on a religious tradition can in part play a role similar to that played by belief.
In the Muslim world, although some of the socioeconomic and anti-secular background for fundamentalism is similar to that elsewhere, many of the groups affected have been different from those in the United States. Islamist movements did not arise so much from defenders of literalist orthodoxy as from professionals, intellectuals, and students who might in earlier decades have turned to nationalism, socialism, or communism. Disillusionment with the failure of Nasser, the symbol of nationalism, to defeat Israel or solve internal problems and with the failures of socialism and capitalism helped turn people toward a search for an idealized Islamic past as the embodiment of a more distinctive identity than that offered by nationalism or Marxism. It became fashionable to think that Islamic solutions could meet moder problems, especially when governments were seen as too secular, too pro-Western, and too compromising in dealing with Israel.49 Despite these differences in background, in most countries with strong NRP movements, we may point to a few key governmental secular measures that helped arouse mass religiopolitics in the past quarter century. In the United States, measures that were greeted with unqualified enthusiasm by liberals were equally despised by biblical literalists. Among these were the proposed Equal Rights Amendment and some key Supreme Court measures, especially the outlawing of prayer in the public schools in 1962 and the granting of abortion rights in 1973. These were part of a growing trend after the 1930s to give the Supreme Court power over the states. Although the notion of the separation of church and state is an ideal going back more than two centuries, the Supreme Court made several key decisions in the 1960s that broadened the meaning of the Bill of Rights and applied it in the states. Fundamentalist Christians believe that the Bible forbids abortion (though the texts they cite seem irrelevant to others) and that outlawing school prayer is an abomination. Most object to the teaching of evolution, and in the postwar period they invented what they called creation science in an attempt to include the biblical account of creation in the official curriculum of the public schools. They have had considerable success, obtaining de facto limits on the teaching of evolution as a part of their continuing efforts in many parts of the country. Especially in many parts of the South, prayer in the school continues even though the Supreme Court has long outlawed it. The Supreme Court is a very visible aspect of the strengthening of the central government, and its nonrepresentative nature makes it an easy target for populist attack.50
In Muslim countries resentment against government has centered on a variety of measures that altered traditional law and mores generally considered Islamic. A common feature in Muslim, and also in many non-Muslim, countries has been the use of increased central government power in ways considered inimical to religion and tradition. Islamic institutions and ulama had controlled most education, courts, and social services, all areas crucial to modernizing states; and friction as the state took these over was inevitable. Traditional ways of dealing with gender, the family, and social mores came increasingly to be seen as Islamic. Newer ways are viewed as not being Islamic. These include growing government control of education and law, and especially legal reforms regarding the family and the role of women.51 India also saw various forms of secularization and actions that favored Muslims and other minorities, plus the reservation of educational and job positions for the lower castes. Significant both in India and the Muslim world was the interference with mores in the name of modernization. In the Muslim World, concern centered on reforms in family law, state encouragement of a presence of women-usually unveiled-in jobs and schools, and both governmental and private flouting of traditional modes of dress and behavior.52
The considerable post-colonial failure of governmental solutions to socioeconomic and cultural problems has brought a growing alienation between people and their governments. is most often tied to ethnic groups, there are other forms of differentiation that are equally significant. In Iran before 1979, the Middle East, and South Asia we find, broadly, two groups. One group of people has had a westernized or modernized, often secular, education, cultural mores and aspirations, and ways of dress and behavior. Another group has followed cultural ways considered traditional. (The word "traditional," however misleading, signals a practice that prominently includes local pre-modern elements.) In the two-culture phenomenon, the size of the gap between the two sides is particularly striking. The modernized culture includes western forms of dress and consumption, heavy dependence on western cultural sources, and command (often everyday use) of a western language as a mode of discourse. Its followers tend to be secular, cosmopolitan, and oriented to Western ideas. Most in this culture often regard those practicing the ways of the traditional culture as backward, superstitious, fanatical, irrational, and so forth. Those in the traditional culture follow forms of gender relations that are closer to those of pre-modern times, such as those typically separating the sexes socially, giving men much control of sisters and wives, insisting on strict limits on sexual relations for women.53 Though this two-culture division was named first (with apologies to C.P.Snow) to address situations in Islamic countries, much of it exists in South Asia, and a variation exists in the United States. There, fundamentalist Christians are offended by contemporary mores and look on their practioners as harmful sinners, while secularists see fundamentalists as irrational, benighted, and so forth.
These two-culture divisions preceded, and have provided a fertile ground for, the rise of New Religious Politics. Those who followed traditional ways often resented the modem mode, especially if, as in the Global South, they saw it as being tied to westerners they disliked. The existence of a large bloc of people who had never modernized provided the popular base for more educated and ideological fundamentalists. The latter often came from rural, small-town, or urban traditional backgrounds. They felt torn between Western and traditional ways, so they looked favorably on movements that encouraged both technology and traditionalism and gave them a mass following. Educated men and women who opt for a "traditional," fundamentalist, and populist identity often find a mass base larger and more enthusiastic than they could have found in the modern sector.
Another feature religiopolitics have in common is their hostility toward the growing power of secular centralized states. The relationship between fundamentalism and the state has rarely been given the weight it deserves.54 In Egypt charges were raised against Nasser's socialism, which centralized the economy and increased controls over the ulama and the highest Muslim university, as Hence, commonalities in the causes and policies of New Religious Politics are notable and explicable; and differences can also be explained. This essay has not exhausted all the points on which religiopolitics are comparable, and in stressing these points it has had to deal lightly with the specifics of each movement. Individual movements or specific features such as militancy or different gender attitudes and practices have received much published discussion elsewhere.55 The great variety in tactics and ideology and changes over time are material for other works, while the stress here has been mainly on comparable features. On the specifics of each movement, a large literature now exists and shows no signs of abating. Here, I have tried rather to stress overall analytic points that may tell us something new about this novel phenomenon. 
